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China and Japan have claimed sovereignty of tiny, uninhabited islands in the East 
China Sea for a long time. This paper attempts to analyze this territorial dispute from the 
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1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION OF THE ISLANDS DESPUTE 
 
A territorial issue of tiny, uninhabited islands in the East China Sea should be 
concluded in the near future. China and Japan have claimed their own sovereignty 
over the islands for a long time. Since the sovereignty is a negotiable interest, I will 
call the territorial issue the islands dispute (Burton, 1996). This paper attempts to 
analyze the islands dispute from the conflict transformation perspective. I believe that 
a key to transforming the dispute is to understand nationalistic attribution among 
Chinese and Japanese based on a World War II (WWII) history of China and Japan 
behind the islands dispute. 
China states, “Diaoyu Dao, which is the islands’ name in Chinese, are 
China’s inherent territory, and Japan grabbed Diaoyu Dao from China” (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2015). Meanwhile, the Japanese 
government insists that these islands, which they named the Senkaku Islands, are 
under the valid control of Japan in light of historical facts and based upon 
international law. Therefore, the Japanese government believes “there is no issue of 
territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015).” 
2 
Felstiner et al. (1980) describe a process of raising a dispute as “Experiences 
become grievances, grievances become disputes, and disputes take various shapes, 
follow particular dispute processing paths (Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat, 1980-1981, 
p.631).” The territorial issue became the islands dispute in the 1970’s, when Taiwan, 
not China, sent a diplomatic note to Japan to declare that Taiwan had the sovereignty 
of the islands for the first time. Under the Nixon administration, the U.S. government 
contemplated returning the islands to Japanese administration.1 To challenge this 
policy, Taiwan claimed its own sovereignty. This incident incited nationalistic 
sensation among Taiwanese, and they broke through Japan’s territorial waters and 
landed on the islands. Nixon urged Taiwan and Japan to resolve the islands dispute 
peacefully at the tripartite committee meeting in Soule. However, China was outraged 
that Taiwan was invited to the meeting as a legitimate government entity. Therefore, 
although Japan proposed a joint-development plan of the islands at the meeting, it was 
not successfully implemented. Right after that, China challenged the Japanese 
sovereignty over the islands for the first time. 
Experiences and grievances must have existed as causes of the islands 
dispute between China, Taiwan, and Japan. For Taiwan, the islands dispute always 
links to a matter as the international legitimacy of Taiwan (Yu, 2015). A history 
                                                   
1 After the end of the WWII, the U.S. occupied Japan and placed the islands under the U.S. military 
administration, but acknowledged Japanese ownership of the islands. 
 
3 
between China and Taiwan exists as the experiences and grievances to have grown up 
to become the islands dispute. Although it is important to analyze the history and 
relationship between China and Taiwan to understand the whole picture of the islands 
dispute, this paper will focus on only the relationship between China and Japan.  
Conflict or dispute can be positive and socially productive in our society. 
Simmel (1964) states, “Conflict is…designed to resolve divergent dualisms; it is a 
way of achieving some kind of unity, even if it be through the annihilation of one of 
the conflicting parties (p.3).” Thus, conflict or dispute can strengthen a unity of two 
different entities. Coser (1956) also points out that conflicts can incite social change 
and increase group unity. He writes, “Conflict can have stabilizing and integrative 
functions for the relationship. It enables social structures to read just by eliminating 
sources of dissatisfaction and eliminating the courses for disassociation (Coser, 1956, 
p. 154).” 
However, a conflict or dispute does not always bring positive influences on 
our society. It can disrupt a human’s relationship or a country itself. It has to be 
concluded to incite social change and increase group unity. To conclude the dispute in 
the positive and constructive way, it has to be “transformed (Lederach, 2015).”  
Conflict Transformation is a new perspective of the conflict or dispute, 
suggested by Lederach. The term “transformation” includes a nuance of seeking a 
4 
constructive change (Lederach, 2015, p.4). “Resolution” implies “finding a solution to 
a problem (Lederach, 2015, p.29).” When we attempt to “resolve” the conflict or 
dispute, “we seek a conclusion (Ledrach, 2015, p.29).” On the other hand, the idea of 
the “transformation” encapsulates not only how to end an undesired situation but also 
what and how to build a desired situation.    
For the islands dispute, China and Japan should seek the transformation 
rather than the resolution. China and Japan have a significant past relationship and 
history. Moreover, they clearly have a significant future relationship. The narrowness 
of resolution approaches may solve the sovereignty issue but miss the greater 
potential for constructive change for the relationship between China and Japan 
(Lederach, 2015, p.69).  
The conflict transformation starts from analyzing the bigger picture of 
relationships and patterns within which the problem arises. The big picture consists of 
three components the presenting situation, the horizon of the future, and the 
development of change processes (Lederach, 2015, p.34). The presenting situation is 
the connection between the present and the past (Ledrach, 2015, p.35). As a first step, 
we have to recognize, understand, and redress historical relationship between China 
and Japan. Lederach (2015) suggests that the past is where the energy of the dispute is 
produced and calls the place as “the epicenter (p.31).” This Lederach’s suggestion 
5 
links to the Felstiner (1980)’s explanation that experiences become grievances and 
grievances become a dispute. 
As a second component, we should set an ideal China-Japan relationship in 
the future. This goal will guide the energy of the dispute for a right direction. To 
support this guidance, we should design change processes (Lederach, 2015 pp.36-37).  
To address the islands dispute, this paper will focus on the first component. I 
believe that there are few studies to understand the epicenter of the islands dispute 
thoroughly. To conclude the islands dispute, I would like to start from the first 
component in this paper and suggest some ideas of the second and third components 
for future studies. 
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CHAPTER II 
ARGUMENTS 
 
China 
Historical records. China mainly argues based on historical records (Drifte, 
2013). China disagrees that Japan first discovered the islands and declared the 
sovereignty under the international law. China offers the following historical records 
and argues that China is the first country to discover the islands and named them as 
Diaoyu Dao. The oldest record is a book, “Voyage with a Tail Wind (Shun Feng 
Xiang Song)”, which recorded that Chinese voyagers regularly passed the Diaoyu 
Dao from 1403 to 1424. The book was published during the reign of Emperor Wanli 
from 1573 to 1620. Now, the copy of the book is housed in the Bodleian library of 
Oxford University. China argues that this book shows that China has already 
discovered the islands at the latest in 1424 and considered them as the China’s 
property (China Internet Information Center, Voyage with a Tail Wind, 2014). Therefore, 
China insists that Japan’s main argument of the terra nullius (Brownlie, 1990)2 is 
invalid. 
To support China’s first discovery of the islands, China also shows records 
                                                   
2 Terra nullius, i.e. new land, for example a volcanic islands, territory abandoned by the former 
sovereign, or territory not possessed by a political community satisfying the criteria of statehood. 
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written by Chen Kan who is an imperial title-conferring envoy from the Ming court to 
Ryukyu in 1534. He stated in the records, “Disoyu Yu, Huangmao Yu, Chi Yu, so 
many islands unfolded before my eyes. Then, Kume Mountain, which is, now, known 
as the Kumejima island governed by Japan, came into sight; that is where the land of 
Ryukyu begins. The Ryukyuans on my ship started singing and dancing excitedly 
because they knew that they had finally returned to their homes (China Internet 
Information Center, Records of the Imperial Title-Conferring Envoys to Ryukyu, 
2014).” China insists that this record also strengthens the China’s argument that the 
islands were not recognized as parts of Ryukyu (Kerr, 1953)3 but China in the 15th 
century.  
Another book which is called “A Mirror of Japan (Ri Ben Yi Jian)” reveals 
that the islands were under Taiwan’s sovereignty. The book was written by Zheng 
Shungong who was dispatched by the Ming court to study in Japan in 1556. He 
recorded a roadmap from Fujian to Japan in this book. The roadmap illustrates that 
“Diaoyu Yu (Diaoyu Dai) is Xiaodong’s affiliated island.” “Xiaodong” was another 
name of Taiwan at that time. Therefore, China says that this record shows that the 
islands were under Taiwan’s sovereignty (China Internet Information Center, 2014). 
 China also offers other two historical records to support its argument. Both of 
                                                   
3 Until Japan incorporated the Ryukyu Kingdom (current Okinawa prefecture) in 1872, the Ryukyu 
Kingdom was not governed by Japan. 
8 
them were recorded in 1561. First, Guo Rulin, who was the imperial title-conferring 
envoy from the Ming court to Ryukyu, described in the records that “the first day of 
May on the lunar calendar, we passed Diaoyu Yu. And on the third day of May in the 
lunar calendar, we arrived at Chi Yu, which separates China and Ryukyu. The 
following day, we saw Kume Mountain (China Internet Information Center, 2014).” 
China states that this passage implies that the Chi Yu was considered as the border 
between China and Ryukyu at that time, so the Diaoyu Dai was a part of China. 
Second, a Chinese geographer, Zheng Ruozeng, wrote “An Illustrated Compendium 
on Maritime Security (Chou Hai Tu Bian) (China Internet Information Center, 2014).” 
The first volume of the book illustrates “A Map of Fujian’s Coastal Mountains and 
Islands (Fujian Yan Hai Shan Sha Tu).” The map includes Diaoyu Dao as the islands 
under China’s jurisdiction at that time. 
 China shows another record that the Chi Yu was the border between China 
and Ryukyu in 1579, and the Daoyu Dao was under the Chinese sovereignty. Its 
record was made by Xiao Chongye who is the imperial title-conferring envoy from 
the Ming court to Ryukyu. He states, “It took us 30 days to arrive at Huangmao Islet. 
And on the first day of lunar May, we passed Diaoyu Yu and two days later, we 
arrived at Chi Yu, which sits at the border between China and Ryukyu. The next day, 
we saw Kume Mountain. (China Internet Information Center, 2014)” 
9 
In 1606, Xia Ziyang, who is also the imperial title-conferring envoy from the 
Ming court to Ryukyu, wrote in his records that “in the afternoon, we passed Diaoyu 
Yu (i.e., Daoyu Dao). The next day, we arrived at Huangwei Yu. That night, the wind 
roared, making the waves surge over the helm…when the water flows from Hei Shui 
back to Cang Shui, it enters Chinese territory (China Internet Information Center, 
2014).” China also shows this record as one of the historical records to prove that the 
islands are China’s sovereignty. As the most recent historical record, China also 
shows the records written by Zhang Xueli who was also the imperial title-conferring 
envoy from the Ming court to Ryukyu in 1663. He stated in his records, “The color of 
the water becomes different, dark blue. The boatman told me we were entering the 
ocean. Instantly, a white line spans from the south to north. The boatman told me the 
line is the borderline separating China from a foreign land (China Internet Information 
Center, 2014).” 
 All of the eight historical records would support that China has already 
discovered the islands and considered the islands under the Chinese sovereignty 
during the 14th to 15th centuries. Five of the records were made by the imperial 
title-conferring envoy from the Ming court to Ryukyu. Ryukyu was an independent 
kingdom of Japan until 1879 (Okinawa prefectural board of education, 2014). So, it 
was not a part of Japan during the 14th and 15th centuries. The Ryukyu kingdom was 
10 
established at the beginning of the 15th century and had a special relationship with 
China. The Ryukyu had to pay tributes to China, and China recognized the Ryukyu as 
an independent country. Therefore, many governmental officials traveled for a 
diplomatic purpose between China and the Ryukyu kingdom. So, there remain many 
records. 
Treaty of Shimonoseki. Secondly, China also argues that Japan took 
advantage of its power gained by the Sino-Japanese war to incorporate the islands into 
Japan’s sovereignty. The Sino-Japanese war, which started on August 1, 1894, was 
concluded on April 17, 1895, by signing the Treaty of Shimonoseki (Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 2008). Although western countries predicted that strong Chinese forces 
could easily win this war, Japan defeated China. As a consequence, China had to sign 
the unequal treaty with Japan. Following the Shimonoseki Treaty, China had to cede 
the entire island of Taiwan and all of its affiliated islands in 1895. Although the treaty 
does not clearly mention about the Diaoyu Dao, China interprets that the treaty of 
Shimonoseki included the Diaoyu Dao in “its affiliated islands.” China argues that 
since Japan unfairly established the Shimonoseki Treaty, Japan cannot claim its 
sovereignty based on it.  
However, Japan disagrees with this point because Japan insists that “the 
Senkaku Islands are an ‘inherent’ part of the territory of Japan (Ministry of Foreign 
11 
Affairs of Japan, 2012).” Thus, Japan does not consider that Japan obtained the 
islands by the winning of the Sino-Japanese war. About this point, Drifte (2013) 
supports Japan’s assertion in his article stating that “strictly speaking, the 
incorporation by the Meiji (Japan) government is not related to the Shimonoseki 
Treaty (Drifte, 2013).” Moreover, the treaty does not clearly mention the islands. The 
treaty only says, “China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the 
following territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property 
thereon; - (b) The island of Formosa (Taiwan), together with all islands appertaining 
or belonging to the said islands of Formosa (Article II) (Taiwan Documents Project, 
2017).” 
 In response, China argues that this wording applies also to the disputed 
islands because they considered them as parts of Taiwan (Drifte, 2013). The wording 
in the Treaty of Shimonoseki is too vague to decide if China had to cede the disputed 
islands by the consequence of the Sino-Japanese war. 
Returning the islands to China by losing WWII. As a third main argument, 
China insists that Japan returned the Diaoyu Dao to China in accordance with legally 
recognized documents, such as the Cairo Declaration, Potsdam Proclamation, and 
Japanese Instrument of Surrender at the end of the WWII (China Internet Information 
Center, 2014). 
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To understand this argument precisely, we have to review the post-WWII 
history. Those documents, the Cairo Declaration, Potsdam Proclamation, and Japanese 
Instrument of Surrender, did not define the Japan’s postwar territory. The San 
Francisco Peace Treaty legally defined the Japan’s postwar territory. And, Japan 
argues that the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not include the Senkaku Islands as the 
territory that Japan renounced under Article II. Under the treaty, the Senkaku Islands 
were placed under the U.S. administration (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 
2012). Then, in 1972, the U.S. returned the Senkaku Islands to Japan with Okinawa. 
However, China was not invited to the international conference to sign the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty because of the Chinese civil war and the controversy over the 
governmental legitimacy of Taiwan. So, China did not participate to the discussion to 
define the Japan’s postwar territory. 
China describes this incident of expanding the U.S. jurisdiction to the islands 
and reverting the administration of the islands to Japan as being illegal and has 
expressed strong opposition until now.  
China concludes the following:  
Any unilateral step taken by Japan regarding Diaoyu Dao will not change the 
fact that it belongs to China. China’s position on Diaoyu Dao has been clear 
and consistent. China will firmly defend its national sovereignty and 
13 
territorial integrity. China’s resolve to uphold agreements made after the 
global anti-fascist war will not be shaken by any force. China has confidence 
and ability to stand up to Japan’s illegal acts, which have ignored historical 
facts and international legal principles. Yet, China remains dedicate[d] to 
safeguarding and maintaining regional peace and order (China Internet 
Information Center, 2014). 
 Although the China’s statement gives us an impression that China has 
consistently kept insisting its sovereignty over the islands, it is only recently that 
China declared the sovereignty over the islands. As indicated in chapter I, Taiwan 
challenged the Japan’s sovereignty over the islands earlier than China in 1970 (Yu, 
2015). Before 1970, neither China nor Taiwan had claimed sovereignty own them. On 
December 3, 1970, China claimed that the islands were parts of China for the first 
time. However, when China claimed the sovereignty, China did not have a strong 
interest on the islands’ sovereignty. Rather, China was offended that Taiwan was 
invited to the tripartite committee meeting. To oppose the agreement of developing 
the islands by Taiwan and Japan together in the meeting, China claimed the 
sovereignty over the islands. 
In 1972, China and Japan normalized diplomatic relations, and in 1978, they 
concluded the Peace and Friendship Treaty. Japan insists that Japan has clearly 
14 
indicated to China Japan’s position that Japan never recognized the existence of an 
issue to be resolved on the territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands during the 
negotiations on the Peace and Friendship treaty in 1978. However, China did not 
oppose Japan’s position at that time. About this point, Drifte (2013) argues that China 
did not disagree with Japan’s position, but China and Japan agreed upon “shelving the 
islands issue (Mondai o tanaage ni suru, 問題を棚上げにする in Japanese) 
(Magosaki, 2012),” 4albeit not in writing or in any public or legal form. The former 
Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai refused to discuss the islands issue by replying, 
“Let’s discuss it another time.” The record of the refusal was omitted by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Japan because the negotiation also included the apology about 
the past Japan’s action by the former Prime Minister Tanaka. The government 
considered that it was too sensitive for Japan, so it omitted the fact from the records. 
However, in 2000, Hashimoto Hiroshi, who was the head of China Division in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan at that time revealed the fact in his interview 
(Drifte, 2013). Although it is impossible to know what the Prime Ministers discussed 
in the negotiations, the point is that China did not insist the sovereignty over the 
                                                   
4 “Shelving the islands issue” meant that both China and Japan acknowledged that they insisted their 
sovereignty over the islands. If they brought up and attempted to resolve the issue, the collision by 
armed force could have been occurred. In order to make the collision not happened, they postponed 
discussing the issue. At that time, China agreed Japan’s administration over the islands, but did not 
agree the Japan’s sovereignty. 
15 
islands during this negotiable opportunity and had not taken any prominent actions 
until 2008. 
On December 7, 2008, two Chinese government vessels hovered and drifted 
inside the sea surrounding the islands for about nine hours. This was the first time that 
Japan observed the Chinese government vessels in that area. The Japanese 
government considered this incident as “the intrusion into Japan’s territorial sea with 
the clear intention of violating the sovereignty of Japan attempting to change the 
status quo through force or coercion (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2017).”    
Two years after the first “intrusion” into the Japan’s territorial sea 
surrounding the islands, no Chinese vessel was found in both the territorial and 
“contiguous seas (Wakatsuki, 2016)5”. However, on September 7, 2010, a Chinese 
fishing boat had collided with two Japanese patrol boats by a Japanese coast guard. 
Although no injuries were reported, this incident has intensified the political tension 
between China and Japan. The Japanese coast guard arrested the captain of the 
Chinese fishing boat after repeatedly ignoring requests to leave the area (Boat 
collisions spark Japan-China diplomatic row, 2010). The Foreign Ministry of China 
said about this incident, “China has repeated its claim to the Diaoyu islands and urged 
Japanese patrol boat in the area against any ‘so-called law enforcement activities or 
                                                   
5 The contiguous sea is “an area stretching 24 nautical miles out from the edge of territorial waters.” 
16 
any actions that would jeopardize Chinese fishing boats or Chinese people.” On the 
other hand, the Foreign Ministry of Japan considers this incident as “a collision of a 
Chinese fishing boat into Japan coast guard patrol vessels in Japan’s territorial sea 
surrounding the Senkaku Islands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2017).” 
In 2010, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan reported that the 
twenty-four Chinese vessels were found in the contiguous sea. No Chinese vessels 
were found in the territorial sea. Although the total number of the Chinese vessels 
entering into the contiguous and territorial seas in 2011 was fourteen, the number was 
dramatically increased in 2012. In December, 2012, the 124 Chinese vessels were 
found in the contiguous sea, and the 21 vessels were found in the territorial sea. The 
reason why China actively behaved in 2012 is that of the two incidents among the 
islands issue in Japan. 
 In April 2012, Ishihara Shintaro, the right-wing Governor of Tokyo declared 
his intention to have his local government buy some of the islands from its private 
Japanese owner (Lah, 2012). To avoid strengthening a tension between China and 
Japan, the Japanese national government of Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda at that 
time bought them in September 2012. The 122 Chinese vessels were found in the 
contiguous sea and the 19 of the vessels were found in the territorial sea next month 
after the event. In December, China commented, “Japan’s administrative control over 
17 
the Senkaku Islands now no longer existed (Drifte, 2013).” Some Chinese also 
conducted a demonstration against Japan and destroyed Japanese stores in China. 
From 2013 to 2015, China has actively behaved in the seas. In 2013, the 739 
Chinese vessels were found in the contiguous sea and the 88 of them were found in 
the territorial sea. In 2014, the number of the Chinese vessels entering into the 
contiguous sea was 748, and the ones entering into the territorial sea was 88. In 2015, 
the 743 Chinese vessels were found in the contiguous sea, and the 95 Chinese vessels 
were found in the territorial sea. 
On June 9, 2016, a Chinese naval ship entered the waters contiguous to the 
Senkaku islands (Stashwick, 2016). Before this incident, Japan found only Chinese 
coast guard ships in the seas, so it was the first time that the Chinese naval ship was 
found. Since Russian military ships were also detected in the contiguous zone on June 
8, the Chinese ship may have been reacting to the Russian vessel’s movement. About 
one week after finding the Chinese naval ship in the contiguous sea, Japan found the 
two Chinese spy ships in the contiguous sea of the islands of Kagoshima prefecture 
and Okinawa prefecture. 
Summary of China’s argument. As I illustrated above, China offers the 
historical records in the 14th and 15th centuries to support that China has already found 
the islands and declared the sovereignty at that time. Moreover, China opposes to the 
18 
U.S.’s action to occupy and return the islands to Japan after the WWII. China also 
thinks that the Treaty of Shimonoseki should be unenforceable because Japan abused 
its power to “steal” the islands or, even though the treat is valid, Japan would have 
already returned the islands to China because of losing the WWII. 
 
Japan 
 
Argument based on the international law. China mainly claims the 
sovereignty based on the historical records in the 14th and 15th centuries whereas 
Japan claims the sovereignty based on the international law (Drifte, 2013). A country 
can publicly claim sovereignty over uninhabited islands if the county finds them for 
the first time (Terra nullius) (Brownlie, 1990)6. Japan insists that the government 
conducted the surveys of the islands several times from 1885 (Hane, 2012)7 and 
                                                   
6 Effective occupation is commonly related to extension of sovereignty to terra nullius. To prove 
possession by states and manifestations of sovereignty legally more potent than those of the other 
claimant or claimants, the states can obtain sovereignty over the terra nullius by the effective 
occupation. 
 
7  The MOFA of Japan claims that the government conducted the surveys of the Senkaku islands 
several times with Okinawa prefecture. As a result, the government carefully confirmed that the islands 
were the terra nullius, and Sino (China) did not administrate the islands. Then, the government decided 
building a sign of the Japanese sovereignty and officially integrating the islands into Japan. About this 
explanation, Hane argues that it is not historically accurate because this description misses that the 
issue of the islands was always discussed as the sovereignty of Okinawa, and Japan has suggested to 
recognize the Chinese sovereignty over Ryukyu (Okinawa) which is included the Senkaku islands. 
Instead of agreeing upon the China’s sovereignty, China should have recognized the same right to 
commerce for Japanese as the one which western merchants had in China at that time. However, the 
suggestion was never become a treaty because of some criticism by Chinese governmental officers and 
19 
concluded that the islands were uninhabited and Sino (China) did not govern them. 
On January 14, 1895, the government officially decided to nationalize the islands as 
parts of the Japanese territory (Kakugi kettei, 閣議決定 in Japanese) and claimed the 
sovereignty to the world. Therefore, “there is no doubt that the Senkaku Islands are 
clearly an inherent part of the territory of Japan, in light of historical facts and based 
upon international law. Indeed, the Senkaku Islands are under the valid control of 
Japan. There exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the 
Senkaku Islands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016).” 
 
Treaty of Shimonoseki and After the WWII. To refute the China’s 
arguments about the Shimonoseki Treaty and the declarations at the end of the WWII, 
Japan emphasizes that the islands were not nationalized by the winning of the 
Sino-Japanese war and the Shimonoseki Treaty. Moreover, Japan did not renounce the 
sovereignty of the islands under the Article II of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. 
Rather, Japan legally obtained the islands, based on the international law. 
  Furthermore, Japan claims that China had not opposed Japan’s 
administration over the islands for about eighty years from 1895 to 1970. For instance, 
                                                                                                                                                 
recovering a relationship between Russia and China during the negotiation. Thus, Hane emphasized 
that the reason why Japan obtained the sovereignty of the islands was because China did not sign the 
agreement. If we know the fact, the statement by the MOFA of Japan seems to want to hide the fact of 
the Japan’s suggestion of renouncing Okinawa with the Senkaku islands. 
Moreover, Shaw (1999) argues that “documents clearly show that there were no such survey (p.84).” 
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a world map made by China in 1960 shows that the islands are the Japanese territories 
(Kenei, 2012). Even after claiming the sovereignty in 1970, China had not conducted 
any action to insist the sovereignty until 2008. However, China suddenly has strongly 
claimed the sovereignty after finding potential petroleum resources. So, Japan 
criticizes this China’s illegitimate motivation to enjoy the resources by claiming the 
sovereignty of the islands.  
No “shelving’ agreement. Some scholars consider that China and Japan 
agreed upon shelving the issues in 1970’s. However, the current Japanese government 
seems to refuse the existence of the “shelving” agreement because it clearly states that 
“there exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku 
Islands.”  
It would be hard to prove whether or not the “shelving” agreement existed. 
Until when the former Prime Minister Noda declared to purchase the islands from the 
private owner in 2012, the issue was not visible. After the purchase by the Japanese 
government. The former Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao made a statement and 
implied that China interpreted that Japan changed the “rule of the game” of this 
islands dispute which has been followed for 40 years (Kenei, 2012).” For China, it 
might have had to defend its own position to prevent losing an opportunity to insist 
the sovereignty over the islands.  
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It should be pointed out that at least there were two misunderstandings 
between China and Japan among the incident in 2012. First, the former Prime 
Minister Noda decided to purchase the islands in order to prevent the escalation of the 
islands dispute. However, despite his intention, China considered the purchase by the 
national Japanese government as breaking the “shelving” agreement. As a 
consequence, the islands dispute was escalated. Second, many Japanese think that 
China has started claiming the sovereignty because of the potential petroleum 
resources (Hane, 2012). However, from the Chinese perspective, the purchase by the 
Japanese government might push China to insist the sovereignty to protect China’s 
national benefits. Although the potential petroleum resources would have been a part 
of reasons why China has started strongly claiming the sovereignty, it was not the 
only decisive reason. However, unfortunately, many Japanese recognize China’s 
resource interest as an only reason because Japanese media has emphasized it. 
Against China’s “invasion.” Many Chinese vessels have been entering into 
the territorial and contiguous seas of the islands from 2008. Japan considers that the 
Chinese vessels’ behaviors show a political message that China does not keep silent 
anymore about the Japan’s administration of the islands (Chuugoku gunkan ga 
sennyuu, 2016). To reply the messages, Japan insists its own position regarding the 
islands sovereignty by the three main tactics; (i) diplomatic criticism (ii) adding the 
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islands dispute on history textbooks used at junior high and high schools (iii) 
increasing national security power in Okinawa and strengthening a self-defense force 
and a bond with the U.S. 
If you visit the official website managed by the MOFA of Japan (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016), you could find the Japan’s claim and other 
supporting information in twelve languages. The website was updated on April 13, 
2016. As I wrote above, the position of the Japanese government is that “there exists 
no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015).”  
In 2014, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science & Technology in 
Japan (MEXT) announced to revise teaching guidelines and textbooks and encourage 
teachers to teach their students that the Senkaku Islands belong to Japan (McCurry, 
2014). Textbooks used in 2014 did not mention the islands dispute. The former 
Minister of the MEXT said, “It is natural for a country to teach its children about the 
government’s positions and integral parts of its own territory (McCurry, 2014).” To 
react to this incident, a spokeswoman at the Chinese foreign ministry told, “We once 
more urge Japan to respect historic realities, stop provocations and teach the younger 
generation a correct historical perspective (McCurry, 2014).” 
The MEXT is no longer a stranger to diplomatic controversy (Pollmann, 
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2015). The teaching guidelines and textbooks have applied to not only history but also 
geography and civic classes at junior high and high schools since April 2016. 
Publishers of the textbooks do not have an obligation to follow the guidelines from 
the MEXT. However, public schools are required to be used the textbooks approved 
by the MEXT, so if the publishers do not comply with this request from the MEXT, 
they might lose the approval and could not sell the textbooks to the public schools 
anymore (Pollmann, 2015). 
This revision of the textbooks broke a historical stance of avoidance of 
teaching the controversial issues in Japanese schools. Many teachers at the junior high 
and high schools have not usually spent a time to teach the controversial issues, such 
as a history of the WWII. This tendency was established because of regrettable 
experiences during the WWII. Japan had carefully protected a school independency of 
influences by the government and religions. However, the current Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe desires “to ditch ‘masochistic’ appraisals of the country’s wartime history, 
promote its territorial claims, and instill feelings of patriotism among school children 
(McCurry, 2014).” His desires influenced on the revision of the school textbooks and 
teaching guidelines. Some people criticize that the Prime Minister’s desires will mean 
omitting the descriptions of wartime atrocities, such as comfort women and the 
Nanking massacre.   
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On March 29, 2016, Japan approved the largest defense budget ($44 billion) 
(Spitzer, 2016). On the same day, new laws went into effect, which allows the 
Japanese self-defense force to use its power for a collective defense purpose8. 
According to the Prime Minister Abe, “the security environment surrounding our 
country is increasingly severe. … In a world where no one nation can protect 
themselves by themselves alone, this legislation will help prevent wars.” Increasing 
severity of the security environment surrounding our country indicates nuclear and 
missile development by North Korea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016) and 
China’s increasingly assertive territorial claims in the East China Sea. On March 27, 
2016, Japan opened a new radar surveillance base near the islands. Chinese authorities 
criticized this incident. China also continues a low-level program of confronting 
Japanese ships and aircraft near the islands. A majority of Chinese armed forces, 
which is the world’s largest standing military, are mainly used for aggressive 
campaigns to assert territorial claims in the South and East China Sea (China says 
military spending increase to be smallest in six years, 2016). (Appendix A) 
                                                   
8 Collective defense force: Under the Self-Defense Forces Act, article 76(2), the prime minister can 
order to mobilize a part of or a whole self-defense under the situations below when he/she considers 
that it is necessary to protect national security. In this case, he/she has to get approved by the congress 
under the law of armed attach situation. 
(2) A situation where an armed attack happened against a country which Japan has an intimate 
relationship, the armed attack threatened an independency of Japan, and an obvious danger which 
invades life, freedom, and a right to pursue happiness of Japanese is recognized (Jietai-hou, 2016).     
25 
CHAPTER III 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
After China claimed its sovereignty of the islands in 1970 to the international 
society for the first time, both China and Japan have insisted on demonstrating their 
sovereignty to the world in various ways. Especially since Japan found that Chinese 
vessels entered to the sea around the islands in 2008, the Japanese government has 
selected more contentious way to insist the sovereignty year by year. China has kept 
sending more vessels to the sea around the islands. It would be true that the reason 
why this islands dispute has escalated is because the location of the islands are 
important shipping lanes, offer rich fishing grounds and lie near potential oil and gas 
reserves, and are strategically significant position for the military between the U.S. 
and China (How uninhabited islands soured China-Japan ties, 2014). However, this 
paper suggests another key factor to explain the reason for the escalation: The islands 
are a symbol of national power for China and Japan. Not only because of resources or 
locational importance but also their national pride will be hurt if they lose their 
control over the islands. This national pride is held by individual Chinese and 
Japanese as a part of their identity. This paper will call such identity as individual 
nationalistic attribution. 
 In this chapter, I will review a theory of Nationalism, Social Identity Theory, 
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and Collective Memory to support my assertion. Each theory is from different 
academic discipline - political science, psychology, and conflict and dispute resolution 
- but all of them focus on an individual self in a context of social groups. The three 
theories agree upon that people are influenced by a society to which they belong and 
have a collective (national) identity.  
Nationalism. Nationalism is primarily a political principle, but some scholars 
explain it from a perspective of the social psychology. Druckman (1994) states that 
“although granting that nationalism is a political, economic, and sociological 
phenomenon, it becomes a social-psychological phenomenon to the extent that 
individuals develop attitudes about their own and other nations (p.44).” Such attitudes 
express the individual people’s feelings toward their own and other nations and their 
sense of loyalty to their own country. “These feelings of attachment are at the heart of 
nationalism.” (Druckman, 1994, p.40) Strong attachments to their nation encourage 
individuals and groups to act hostilely toward their perceived enemy such as 
dehumanizing the members of their outgroup. 
 Not all strong attachments to a nation show negative feeling toward other 
nations. (Druckman, 1994, p.46) Druckman suggested that we must first consider the 
importance of group loyalty to the individuals in the group to understand a condition 
which one group generates negative or hostile feelings toward other groups. 
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(Druckman, 1994, p.44) Loyalty is an emotion toward the group to which individuals 
belong. Important loyalty can become a part of their identity through a grouping 
process. Loyalty to a certain group also strengthens a person’s identity and her sense 
of belonging to the group.  
The grouping is essential for people because the groups can satisfy their 
human needs, such as self-protection and self-transcedence. (Druckman, 1994, p.44) 
This grouping process has also common aspects with the ways by which an individual 
relates to her nation. When people sentimentally attach to the homeland, they are 
motivated to help their country, and gain a sense of identity and self-esteem through 
their national identification, the nation becomes a part of their identity. 
Theories of cognitive development suggest that as individuals move from a 
self- to other-orientation, they also begin to distinguish among the others, becoming 
more attached and sympathetic to some and more critical and detached from others. 
(Druckman, 1994, p.45) Therefore, the groups which they belong to through birth or 
through early experience have an impact on which they deem to be ingroup and which 
outgroup. Moreover, these perceptions of ingroup and outgroup can be transferred to 
the larger system such as nation.  
Feshbach and his colleagues (Feshbach, 1987, 1990; Kosterman and 
Feshbach, 1989) researched the relationship between positive feelings toward one’s 
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own group and negative feeling toward others. Their research revealed two factors 
about attitudes toward one’s own and other countries. One factor focused on feelings 
about one’s own country. It is labeled as “patriotism.” Another factor involved 
feelings of national superiority and a need for national power and dominance. It is 
named as “nationalism.” Nationalism is associated more with a competitive or 
militaristic approach to the world, whereas, Patriotism with a more cooperative or 
peaceful approach to the world. 
Adorno, et al. (1950) also notes a difference between a healthy patriotic love 
of one’s own country, not associated with prejudice against outgroups, and an 
ethnocentric patriotism (like nationalism) which was associated with such prejudice. 
Duckitt (1989) similarly indicated that ethnocentric patriotism was associated with 
insecure group identifications, and patriotism was related to secure group 
identifications. 
From a different perspective of interpreting the difference between 
nationalism and patriotism, it also can be interpreted that nationalism is merely a more 
complex form of the patriotism. Thus, patriotism is a readiness to sacrifice for the 
nation, but nationalism is the readiness to sacrifice for the nation plus exclusion of 
others. Nationalism suggests that loyalty is not only feelings associated with a group 
but also images of what in-group and out-group are like.  
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Kelman (1997) provides another approach for interpreting nationalism and 
patriotism from the perspective of social psychology. He argues that people still keep 
seeing the nation-state as the primary factor of human dignity in the modern world. 
These people’s perception is rooted in nationalist ideology. And, this nationalist 
ideology draws heavily on patriotism as the source of trust and support for the state.  
According to his definitions, patriotism is an ideology, or attitude and beliefs, 
which refer to individuals’ attachment and loyalty to their nation and country. 
Nationalism is an ideology of any movement toward the establishment of a new 
nation-state. Nationalism provides a justification for the existence or creation of a 
state. It also entitles the nation-state to the support of its members in establishing and 
maintaining the state’s independence, integrity, and effective functioning. 
The centrality of the nation-state in the global system creates a dynamic 
tendency to transform patriotism into nationalism. It is most likely to occur when 
members of an ethnic or national group come to see the establishment of a state of 
their own as the proper response to a sense of grievance and oppression, to a historical 
opportunity, or both. The reverse relationship holds also true universally. Existing 
nation-states and movements directed toward establishment of such a state 
characteristically rely on patriotism as a major source of legitimacy, or popular 
support, and of member loyalty. The nationalist movements utilize patriotic 
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sentiments to instill nationalist ideology in the population. In effect, nationalism 
appropriates people’s attachment and loyalty to the country as a basis for their 
attachment and loyalty to the state.  
Kelman (1997) illustrates the group loyalty possessed by nationalist as 
national identity. When people start seeing themselves as constituting a unique and 
identifiable entity, they have acquired a sense of national identity (Kelman, 1997). 
National identity forms a system of beliefs, values, assumptions, and expectations, 
which are shared by group members. National identity becomes incorporated in an 
individual’s personal identity through various processes of social influence.  
Adoption of the specific elements of national identity may also affect 
individuals’ personal self-definition by contributing to their worldview (Kelman, 
1997). It typically contains beliefs and values relating to the meaning of human 
existence, the nature of social institutions, the conduct of human relationships, and the 
definition of the ideal personality. These are rooted in the group’s historical 
experiences and reflected and elaborated in its documents, traditions, and institutional 
forms. Such beliefs and values influence the way these individuals view the world and 
their own place in it and the way they conceive their relationship to the environment 
(Kelman, 1997). 
The adoption of elements of national identity involves a acquiring some 
31 
substantive knowledge of the historical and cultural context of its beliefs and values. 
They must see these beliefs and values as personally meaningful to them and 
somehow translate them into concrete practice in their daily lives (Kelma, 1997). 
Although Kelman (1997) did not elaborate if national identity must contain 
negative attitudes toward outgroups, since he considers that the patriotism is a source 
of the nationalist ideology, national identity would include not only the positive 
attitude toward ingroups (patriotism) but also the negative attitude toward outgroups 
(nationalism or ethnocentric patriotism). 
Kelman (1997) also states that in the modern world, national consciousness 
finds it as the most powerful political expression in the nation-state. People look to 
the nation-state to represent their national identity and protect their rights and interests. 
Nationalist people seek to express the national identity of its people in an independent 
nation or state.  
This national consciousness can be a powerful source of unity and political 
legitimacy for the state. Therefore, political leaders attempt to create a national 
consciousness with boundaries of the political system. If the political leaders succeed, 
then the attachment and loyalty to the nation-state and the patriotic sentiments can be 
utilized by the state as a source of legitimacy, of citizens’ support or its policies, and 
of citizens’ willingness to make sacrifices in pursuit of these policies. 
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In addition to Nationalism, the Social Identity Theory provides details about 
when the individuals tend to show positive attitude toward ingroup and negative 
attitude toward outgroups.    
  Social Identity Theory. The Social Identity Theory (SIT) focuses on “the 
group in the individual” and assumes that parts of the people’s self-concept are 
defined by social groups to which we belong (Trepte, 2006). The theory was proposed 
by Henri Tajfel at the beginning of the 1970s in the U.K (Hogg & Burke, 2006). As a 
Polish Jew in Europe during the WWII, he had experienced the Holocaust and the 
postwar relocation of displaced Europeans, so he had a personal passion to understand 
prejudice, discrimination, and intergroup conflict. (Hogg & Bruke, 2006) He believed 
that society can make individuals follow certain behaviors. 
The social identity approach is one of the most influential theories of group 
processes and intergroup relations. (Hornsey, 2008) This approach has redefined how 
we think about numerous group-mediated phenomena and extended the confines of 
social psychology (Hornsey, 2008). Tajfel and his colleagues established the ideas of 
the SIT by an experimental paradigm, which is called “minimal group paradigm.” In 
the experiments, participants were allocated into groups on the basis of meaningless 
criteria (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). After having been told their group 
membership, they had to allocate points to members of their own group (the 
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“ingroup”) and to members of the other group (the “outgroup”). There was no 
interaction among group members and they even did not know who else was in their 
group. The groups did not have any history and future outside the laboratory. No 
individual participants could get any personal benefits by allocating the point to the 
ingroup.  
Even so, the participants tended to give more points to members of the 
ingroup than to members of the outgroup. Thus, even these minimal conditions led the 
members to ingroup favoritism and discrimination against the outgroup. They tried to 
maximize the difference in rewards between ingroup and outgroup, whereas 
maximizing their own ingroup profit was less important to them (Trepte, 2006). This 
result cannot be explained by traditional theories of intergroup relations, which 
explain collective phenomena in terms of isolated individual processes or 
interpersonal interaction alone (Hogg, 2006). In order to explain this phenomenon, 
Tajfel (1971) and his colleagues formalized SIT. 
Tajfel and Turner argue that human interaction ranges on a spectrum from 
being purely interpersonal to purely intergroup. A purely interpersonal interaction 
involves people relating entirely as individuals without awareness of social categories. 
A purely intergroup interaction is one in which people relate entirely as 
representatives of their groups. Sliding from the interpersonal to the intergroup end of 
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the spectrum impacts how people see themselves and each other (Hornsey, 2008).  
The mere process of making a distinction between “us and them” can change 
how people see members of the outgroups. When this category distinction is salient, 
people enhance similarities within the ingroup and differences among the outgroup 
(Hornsey, 2008). The categorization also can change how people see themselves. By 
categorization, people activate a different level of self-concepts. At the purely 
interpersonal end of the spectrum, a person’s self-concept is defined as “personal 
identity”, which is distinct from other individuals. At the purely intergroup end of the 
spectrum, the person’s self-concept as “social identity,” which derived from social 
categories to which she belongs. Tajfel defined the social identity as “the individual’s 
knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and 
value significance to him of this group membership (Tajfel, 1972).” The people who 
share the same social identity have the same definition of who they are, what 
attributes they have, and how they relate to and differ from people who are in the 
outgroup (Hogg, 2006). Although people have many social and personal identities, in 
any given situation, only one (or some selected) identity becomes psychologically 
important and is used to govern behavior (Hogg, 2006).   
The reason why people are motivated by competitive intergroup behavior is a 
desire for a positive and secure self-concept (Hornsey, 2008). To obtain a positive 
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social identity, group members are motivated to think and behave to achieve or 
maintain a positive distinctiveness between the ingroup and outgroup. 
After Tajfel died in 1982, Turner and his colleagues sought to refine the SIT 
(Hornsey, 2008). They established a new and separate theory, “Self-Categorization 
Theory (SCT).” Though, the SCI and SCT share the same assumptions and methods. 
Proponents of both SIT and SCT argue that “social psychology must acknowledge the 
functional interdependence of mind and mental processes (Turner & Reynolds, 2011).” 
People live in a social structured system which has group-based regulations of 
perception, cognition, and conduct. The group-based norms affect people’s minds. 
The distinction between personal identity and social identity which is based on a 
group behavior is the shared idea of both SCI and SCT. 
A core purpose of the SIT was to explain reasons why people discriminated 
in the minimal group paradigm, but the SCT addressed a different question, “Why did 
the people identify with the minimal groups and act in ways that the identity mattered 
to them? (Turner & Reynolds, 2011, p.401)” The SCT argued that people internalize 
social identity with their emotion and valued into the self. Through this internalization 
process, they compare themselves with other groups, and their motivation for positive 
distinction can produce a favor for the intergroup. The SIT also explained the self as 
the spectrum of the interpersonal and intergroup ends, but the SCT described it as the 
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continuum. Therefore, Turner could recognize that people could act as both an 
individual and a group member. 
  Turner reformed the personal-social identity distinction as the three levels 
of self-categorization: the superordinate category of the self as human being or human 
identity (distinguish from other animals), the intermediate level of the self as a 
member of a social ingroup as defined against other groups of humans (social 
identity), and the subordinate level of personal self-categorizations based on 
interpersonal comparisons (personal identity) (Hornsey, 2008). Contextual factors and 
current goals, needs, and purposes of a person determine which identity (personal 
identity, social identity, or human identity) emerges.  
Furthermore, Turner proposed a theory of group behaviors in terms of an 
“identity mechanism (Turner & Reynolds, 2011).” One is that, he assumed, if people 
define themselves and others as members of the same category, they would 
self-stereotype to see themselves as more similar than others in a different group. The 
process is referred as “depersonalization.” When a category becomes salient, people 
see themselves and members of other categories as less individuals. The notion of the 
depersonalization supports many group processes, such as cohesion, influence, 
conformity, and leadership. Through the process of the depersonalization, the group 
identity defines not only what the group member is but also what kinds of attitudes, 
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emotions, and behaviors are appropriate in a certain context as a group member. The 
information form what is crucial and appropriate to think, feel, and act as an ingroup 
member. People who highly identify themselves as a member of the ingroup highly 
internalize the norms and values of the ingroup into themselves. Therefore, this 
implicit shared expectation of agreement among the ingroup members can obstacle to 
change opinions and attitudes toward the outgroup. The categorization also can 
explain a phenomenon of group polarization, which is that people tend to shift their 
individual opinions to their ingroup’s favor. 
 The problems of the ingroup favoritism can be overcome by transforming 
intergroup behaviors into harmonious intragroup behaviors (Hogg, 2006). 
Re-categorizing a social identity seems to be effective to overcome the problem, but it 
is difficult to achieve when people have a strong attachment to their original groups. 
Theoretically, for a social group having stronger power than its outgroup, if its 
member can recognize a common ingroup identity with the outgroup (Hornsey & 
Hogg, 2000), the transformation could occur. For a social group having weaker power 
than its outgroup, its members can overcome the ingroup favoritism by recognizing 
that the members of the outgroup are parts of themselves (Wright, Aron, & Tropp, 
2002).   
 Collective Memory. Collective memory is a significant construct to 
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consider a long history of conflict (Tint, 2010). The processes of remembering 
incidents can occur in a social domain. Thus, neither individual nor group memory 
can independently exist in our society. Each society can have more than one collective 
memory. Many memories can exist in a society which has many groups or culture. 
Memory is not produced by a passive process. Rather, both individuals and societies 
select their remembrances, based on their current needs, beliefs, and goals (as cited in 
Tint, 2010,). Moreover, the processes of constructing a memory are consistent in a 
society. For instance, a politicization of memory tends to offer political and cultural 
aims of a society (as cited in Tint, 2010).    
 Memory also strongly connects to narrative, commemoration, identity, and 
emotions (Tint, 2010). Conflicts are seen as a narrative consisting of collective 
memory (as cited in Tint, 2010). Through commemoration, such as acknowledging, 
honoring, and recycling events of pasts, a social group interprets and establishes a 
perception of the events as collective memory. Through this cultivating process, 
people “chose traumas and glories (as cited in Tint, 2010).”  Furthermore, many 
cultural groups create national narratives to accomplish political aims at that time (as 
cited in Tint, 2010). Thus, the events of the past are selected, omitted, fabricated, 
exaggerated, and embellished through the process of creating collective memory (as 
cited in Tint, 2010). Collective memory is not only memories which are passed down 
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but also values, emotions, and beliefs in a certain society (Tint, 2010). Moreover, a 
political leader of groups strongly influences on these selection, omission, fabrication, 
exaggeration, and embellishment. It is important to recognize that collective memory 
being shared by a group is not necessarily historical fact, and rather the collective 
memory may create their reality. To challenge or oppose to the process of creating the 
collective memory, providing counter memory can be useful (as cited in Tint, 2010). 
The counter memory may be able to make the master commemorative narrative less 
influential for the group. Providing the outgroup’s perspective of the incident and 
creating a new story together would allow the parties to unlock themselves from the 
past to the present and future (Tint, 2010). 
 Collective memory is the most important means to develop a social identity 
(Tint, 2010). As Tint points out in her article by referring to the Social Identity Theory, 
the memory informs the social identity and also is informed by the social identity. 
When a group experiences some threat to its group identity, commemoration becomes 
an important tool to preserve their nationalistic sentiment. Or, for a political reason, 
the process of cultivating a collective memory is utilized to strengthen a sense of 
nationalism and social identity (as cited in Tint, 2010). Collective memory can either 
enhance or weaken social or national identity in social groups.  
  Application for Chinese and Japanese. Chinese and Japanese have a 
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national identity as a member of China or Japan. A degree and type of the national 
identity would be varied depending on individuals. In some conditions, the identity 
produces a negative attitude toward outgroup (nationalism or ethnocentric patriotism). 
This paper calls this negative individual attitude toward outgroup as the individual 
nationalistic attribution. 
Chinese and Japanese having a strong individual nationalistic attribution 
would support their own nation’s sovereignty and oppose to the other’s. Japanese 
having a strong individual nationalistic attribution would tend to favor Japan as an 
ingroup. In terms of the islands dispute, the Japanese evaluate Japan by comparing 
China as an outgroup. To strive for a positive social identity as a Japanese in the world, 
they are motivated to think and behave to achieve or maintain a positive 
distinctiveness between Japan (the ingroup) and China (the outgroup). Chinese who 
have a strong individual nationalistic attribution would think and behave to achieve a 
positive distinctiveness between China and Japan because of the same reason. 
Furthermore, those who have a strong individual nationalistic attribution would be 
difficult to support the outgroup’s sovereignty, because both of Japan and China 
clearly are insisting their own sovereignty. Thus, both of them strive for the exclusive 
sovereignty. The members who have the strong individual nationalistic attribution 
would support to their ingroup’s position.  
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To transform the islands dispute, it is also important to recognize that the 
individual nationalistic attribution is originated from the WWII history. For Chinese, 
the historical humiliation by the Japan’s invasion as a collective memory has 
established the China’s individual nationalistic attribution. For Japanese, their 
individual nationalistic attribution has been constructed by responding the China’s 
critiques.  
Based on this hypothesis, I also assume that Chinese would show stronger 
individual nationalistic identity than Japanese population because China has 
experienced national humiliation by Japan during the WWII. This sense of grievance 
is not just an old history for Chinese. This history is still passed down from one 
generation to other generations in China as a vivid memory. Chinese would see 
insisting on sovereignty over the islands as the proper response to a sense of grievance 
and oppression. Therefore, Chinese would show stronger individualistic attribution 
than Japanese. 
Similarly, the Japanese nationalistic sensation against China has been raised 
by reacting to the Chinese nationalism. The fact that Japan is still perceived as one of 
the WWII perpetrators by China has created the social identity as Japanese. A Japan 
desire is that although Japan made the biggest mistake about ninety years ago, Japan 
wants to be seen as a totally different country from the one during the WWII by the 
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world. The current Prime Minister Abe publicly conveyed this message to the world 
in his speech (Japan’s prime minister Shinzo Abe apologetic over WWII, but says 
next generation not obliged, 2015). Prime Minister Abe expressed a regret and the 
utmost grief over the WWII and apologized Japan’s aggression. However, he also 
stated that “We must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations 
to come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologize (Abe, 
2015).” Therefore, China’s criticism or concern based on the WWII history would 
bother the Japanese identity.  
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CHAPTER IV 
SURVEY 
 
Describe the Sample 
The survey was distributed to two different groups. The first group was 
Chinese and Japanese students and faculty who at University of Oregon (Group 1). 
The second group was Chinese and Japanese who could comprehend English to 
respond the survey via the Amazonmechanical turk9 (Group 2).  
At the stage of distributing the surveys, I did not set clear definitions of 
Chinese and Japanese. I primarily distributed the survey for those who probably have 
either Chinese or Japanese nationality. In total, 62 surveys were randomly distributed 
to potential Chinese survey candidates (22 of them are from the group 1, and 40 of 
them are from the group 2.). I received 36 answers (22 were the first group, and 14 are 
the second group), and 30 are qualified participants in the survey as a Chinese. To 
select the qualified candidates, I excluded 7 candidates who have not lived in China 
more than five years, did not have the Chinese nationality, and did not write a Chinese 
city as a hometown. Taiwanese is also excluded from the analysis. Taiwanese could 
                                                   
9 https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome 
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indicate their identification in Section 1 by answering the question of “choosing the 
nationality.” In the total 30 qualified participants, there was only one participant to 
indicate that “I am a Taiwanese.”  
36 surveys were randomly distributed to potential Japanese candidates. 21 of 
them were sent to the group 1, and 15 of them were sent to the group 2. I received 33 
answers (21 are from the group 1, and 12 were from the group 2), and 25 are the 
qualified participants in the survey as a Japanese. I excluded 8 candidates who have 
not lived in Japan more than five years, did not have the Japanese nationality, and did 
not write a Japanese city as a hometown. (Appendix B) 
Research Question 
The main purpose of the survey is to discover how the individual 
nationalistic attribution influences on an individual attitude toward the dispute of the 
islands. Section 3 and section4 in the survey tested the question. Section 3 of the 
survey consists of the four sub-questions. The section measured the participants’ 
degrees of nationalistic attribution. The section 4 asks their opinion about the islands 
conflict. By combining the two results of the two sections, the result would reveal 
how the individual nationalistic attribution related to the attitudes toward the islands 
dispute. The hypothesis will be explained below. 
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The four sub-questions in the Section 3: Measure the participants’ 
individual nationalistic attribution. The four sub-questions in the Section 3 
measured the participants’ individual nationalistic attributions. These questions are 
based on the theory of the collective memory. I chose the four historical incidents as 
important tools for cultivating the collective memory among Chinese. Of course, 
China has more than fifty ethnicities, so it has more than one collective memory. 
However, in terms of the relationship with Japan, the most significant historical 
trauma for China is Japan’s invasion before and during WWII. This historical incident 
is conveyed as a narrative from the old generation to young generation and a seed of 
Chinese collective memory which can either enhance or weaken their social or 
national identity as a Chinese. Therefore, to measure each participant’s nationalistic 
attribution (i.e. a degree of the social identity), I chose (1) Japan invading China 
before and during the World War II and (2) the controversy of how many Chinese 
were killed by Japanese during the Nanking incident as measurements. The Nanking 
incident is a historical incident that in 1937, the Japanese army forces murdered 
people including both soldiers and civilians in the Chinese city of Nanking (or 
Nanjing). There is a huge controversy between China and Japan about how many 
Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed by the Japanese army forces (Askew, 2002). 
Furthermore, (3) the visits to the Yasukuni shrine by the Japanese Prime 
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Ministers and cabinet members, and (4) Description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in 
Japanese history textbooks can also measure the nationalistic attribution of the 
Chinese population. The visitation of the Yasukuni shrine relates to the history of 
WWII. The Yasukuni shrine is a Japanese Shinto’s shrine to commemorate and honor 
dead people who served in wars since 1879. The shrine enshrines war criminals of 
WWII (Yasukuni Shrine, 2017). Therefore, China protests the visitation by the 
Japanese Prime Ministers and cabinet members. As I wrote in Chapter I, the Japanese 
government reacted on China’s argument over the island sovereignty by revising 
teaching guidelines and textbooks and encouraging teachers to teach their students 
that the Senkaku Islands belong to Japan in 2014 (See Chapter I). Chinese strongly 
opposed to the corrected description in the school textbooks. Therefore, I also chose 
these two relatively recent events as a measurement. (Appendix C) 
For the Japanese population, it is little hard to find their collective memory in 
terms of a relationship with China. WWII is one of the biggest historical traumas for 
the Japanese, but it is the more important collective memory in terms of a relationship 
with the U.S. rather than China because Japan perceives itself as a loser or perpetrator 
and like a victim in certain incidents during the war, such as dropping the two atomic 
bombs. In terms of the relationship with China, Japan is an invader, and China is a 
victim. Furthermore, since education about WWII in Japan generally focus on 
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incidents with the U.S, many Japanese have been passed the stronger memory of the 
war with the U.S. rather than China. Therefore, the history of the WWII itself is not a 
direct collective memory to create the social identity as Japanese when we talk about 
the relationship with China. 
For Japanese participants, the survey asked their feelings about (1) What 
China says about the Japanese invasion before and during the World War II, (2) the 
controversy of how many Chinese were killed by Japanese during the Nanking 
incident, (3) What China says about the visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese 
Prime Ministers and cabinet member, and (4) What China says about description of 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese history textbooks. The Japanese collective 
memory is consist of China’s criticism about the WWII invasion, the Nanking 
incident, the visitation of the Yasukuni, and recent Japanese government’s tactic to 
insist the sovereignty of the islands. (Appendix D)  
The participants chose the most accurate feelings from “Highly Comfortable”, 
“Comfortable”, “Neutral”, “Rarely comfortable”, “Highly uncomfortable”, 
“Indifference”, or “Unknown.”  
The participants who have a strong individual nationalistic attribution would 
be likely to choose the answers of “Highly uncomfortable” and “Uncomfortable” in 
Section 3. On the other hand, people having a weak nationalistic attribution would be 
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likely to choose the answers of “Comfortable”, or “Highly comfortable”. Participants 
who chose “neutral” means that they have neither strong nor weak nationalistic 
attributions regarding the selected historical incidents. Those who chose the answer of 
“unknown” or “indifference” cannot be measured their nationalistic attribution from 
the prepared questions. 
Each participant received a score based on their responses in Section 3. The 
scores were calculated by the following equation; 
Score= “Score of sub-question 1 + Score of sub-question 2 + Score of sub-question 3 
+ Score of sub-question 4” 
The scores were calculated by “Highly Comfortable” as -2, “Comfortable” as -1, 
“Neutral,” “Indifference,” and “Unknown” as 0, “Uncomfortable” as 1, “Highly 
Uncomfortable” as 2. For instance, if a Chinese participant chose “Highly 
Comfortable” for sub-question 1 (Japan invading China before and during the World 
War II), “Unknown” for sub-question 2 (the controversy of how many Chinese were 
killed by Japanese during the Nanking incident as measurements.), “Highly 
Uncomfortable” for sub-question 3 (the visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese 
Prime Ministers and cabinet member) and “Uncomfortable” for sub-question 4 (the 
description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese history textbooks), the 
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participant’s score would be calculated by “ -2 + 0 + 2 + 1 = 1.” Thus, the 
participant’s score is 1 and has a strong nationalistic attribution. 
Section 4: Opinions about the islands dispute. In Section 4, the two questions 
the participants’ attitudes toward the islands dispute. The first question asked, “Based 
on your knowledge, which country governs the islands?” This question simply asked 
how the participants perceive current situation of the islands. The second question 
asked, “which country should govern the islands?” They could demonstrate their 
opinions about the issues. By the combination of the two questions, the survey could 
accurately reveal each participant’s understanding and opinion of the dispute. For 
instance, some participants might think that although the islands are governed by 
Japan by their understanding, they think that no country should govern them. I could 
obtain both of the information. 
For the two questions in Section 4, the participants could choose “China”, 
“Japan”, “Other/Other option”, or “No country should govern the islands.” If the 
participants chose the answer of “China”, they would have answered the 
sub-questions; “Why do you think that China should govern the islands?”, “Why do 
you think that Japan should not govern the islands?”, and “Why do you think that 
China insists upon its sovereignty over the islands?” If the participants chose the 
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answer of “Japan”, they would have answered the sub-questions; “Why do you think 
that Japan should govern the islands?”, “Why do you think that China should not 
govern the islands?”, and “Why do you think that Japan insists upon its sovereignty 
over the islands?” The participants chose the answer of “Other/Other option” would 
explain their opinions after that. And, those who chose the answer of “No country 
should govern the islands” would also provide the reason why they chose the answer. 
(Appendix E) 
By comparing the data of Section 3 and Section 4, the survey will reveal the 
relationship between the individual nationalistic attitudes and the attitudes toward the 
islands dispute. 
Main Hypothesis 
I hypothesized that the participants showing the strong individual 
nationalistic attribution in Section 3 would be likely to support their country’s 
sovereignty and oppose to another country’s sovereignty in Section 4. Therefore, the 
participants indicating the strong individual nationalistic attribution in Section 3 
would be likely to choose their own national country (If China is the national country, 
the person would answer that China should govern the islands.) in the question of 
“Which country should govern the islands?” If this hypothesis is correct, the result 
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would suggest that the individual nationalistic attribution (social identity or national 
identity) among Chinese and Japanese is the energy of the islands dispute, thus, “the 
epicenter (Lederach, 2003)” of the dispute. So, it is necessary to address the epicenter 
to transform the dispute into a positive future. 
Results- Chinese population 
 There are 28 qualified results of the Chinese population. In the 28 
participants, the 27 participants agreed upon participating in this study after reading 
an instruction. The only one participant disagreed upon participating to the study after 
reading the instruction. The instruction describes that a purpose of the study is to 
research about the islands dispute between China and Japan. The participants were 
selected because they were assumed that they were from China. And, the survey is 
confidential and voluntary participation and identifies who the researcher is.  
Individual Nationalistic Attribution (Appendix F) 
Japan invading China before and during the WWII. 5 Chinese 
participants chose the “Highly Uncomfortable” and 14 Chinese participants chose the 
“Uncomfortable” about the Japan invading China before and during the WWII. 5 
people chose the “Neutral”, and 2 people chose the “Indifference.” Only 3 people 
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chose the “Comfortable” about this topic, and there was nobody to choose the “Highly 
Comfortable” or “Unknown” about the topic. 
The controversy of how many Chinese were killed by Japanese during 
the Nanking incident. 13 Chinese participants chose the “Highly Uncomfortable” 
and 8 Chinese participants chose the “Uncomfortable” about the controversy of how 
many Chinese were killed by Japanese during the Nanking (Nanjing) incident. 3 
people selected the “Neutral”, and only 2 people chose the “Comfortable” about this 
issue. 2 people chose the “indifference,” and there was no participant to choose the 
“Highly Comfortable” or “Unknown.” 
The visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese Prime Ministers and 
cabinet members. 8 people chose the “Uncomfortable” and 6 Chinese chose the 
“Highly Uncomfortable” about the issue of the visitation to the Yasukuni shrine by 
Japanese Prime Ministers and cabinet members. 7 people selected the “Neutral” and 
one person chose the “Indifference.” There is only one person who selected 
“Comfortable” or “Highly Comfortable.” 2 people chose “Unknown” about this issue. 
Description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese history textbooks. 
About this topic of the description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese history 
textbooks, 10 Chinese chose the “Neutral.” 6 people chose the “Rarely Comfortable 
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(= Uncomfortable)” and 6 people chose the “Highly Uncomfortable” about this issue. 
One person chose the “Indifference,” and four people chose the “Unknown” about 
this issue. 
Combination between individual nationalistic attribution and individuals’ 
attitudes (Section 3 &4) 
The participant having the strongest individual nationalistic attribution’s 
score was 8 in the 28 participants (K). The participant having the weakest individual 
nationalistic attribution’s score was -3 (X). The mean of the score is 3.0. K’s answer 
of Section 4 is “China.” The K also replied that China governs the islands now, based 
on his/her knowledge. However, X’s answer of Section 4 is also “China. The X also 
replied that China governs the islands now, based on his/her knowledge.  
The 21 participants (72%) got the score above 0 (Strong Individual 
Nationalistic Attribution). In the 21, 13 participants (62%) supported the China’s 
sovereignty over the islands. 2 participants (10%) thought that “No country should 
govern the islands.” 2 participants (10%) chose the “other/other option.” One of the 2 
participants who chose the “other/other option” wrote, “I don't know enough about 
Diaoyu Island and the history of its ownership to answer this question.” The other 
participant wrote, “No opinion on it.” 4 people (20%) supported the Japan’s 
sovereignty. All of them provided the reasons for their attitudes. The two of them said 
54 
the reason why they supported the Japan’s sovereignty is that “Historically, Japan has 
governed the islands.” The reason why they did not support the China’s sovereignty is 
that “The islands were stolen by China.” However, both of them did not know why 
Japan insists the sovereignty of the islands. The other two supported the Japan’s 
sovereignty because “International law supports Japanese sovereignty.” The one 
chose the reason why he/she does not support the China’s sovereignty is that “The 
islands were stolen by China.” For the same question, the other answered that 
“Chinese statements are unreasonable.” Both of them had no idea why Japan insists 
the sovereignty over the islands. 
The 7 participants (25%) got the score below or equal 0 (Weak Individual 
Nationalistic Attribution). In the 7, 3 participants (43%) chose “No country should 
govern the islands.” One participant (14%) supported the Japan’s sovereignty. Two 
(29%) chose “Other/Other option.” The one wrote, “I’m indifferent.” The other 
person wrote “both should have a piece (of the islands).” Only one participant (14%) 
supported the China’s sovereignty. The person chose the reason why they supported 
the China’s sovereignty is that “International law supports Chinese sovereignty.” The 
one chose the reason why the person does not support the Japan’s sovereignty is that 
“Japan invaded China in the past.” The person does not have any ideas of why China 
insisted upon the sovereignty over the islands. (Appendix F) 
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Analysis 
The majority of the participants having the strong individual nationalistic 
attribution support the Chinese sovereignty (62%). Only 20 % of the participants 
showing the strong individual nationalistic attribution support the Japanese 
sovereignty. This result supports the hypothesis. Moreover, the majority of the people 
having the weak individual nationalistic attribution chose the attitude toward the 
dispute of the islands other than supporting the Chinese sovereignty (86%). However, 
14% of the participants showing the weak individual nationalistic attribution support 
the Chinese sovereignty. In order to analyze those who did not support the hypothesis, 
I will review other factors which might control their results. 
Results- Japanese population 
There are 25 qualified results of the Japanese population. In the 25 
participants, all of the participants agreed upon participating in this study after reading 
the instruction. The 25 participants indicate that their nationality is Japanese, and the 
2 participants indicate that their nationality is the United States of America.  
Individual Nationalistic Attribution (Appendix F) 
What China says about the Japanese invasion before and during the 
WWII. 8 Japanese participants chose the “Highly Uncomfortable” and 5 Japanese 
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participants chose the “Uncomfortable” about what China says about the Japanese 
invasion before and during the WWII. 6 people chose the “Neutral”, and 1 person 
chose the “Indifference.” Only 2 people chose the “Comfortable” about this topic, and 
there was nobody to choose the “Highly Comfortable.” There were 3 people 
“Unknown” about the topic.    
The controversy of how many Chinese were killed by Japanese during 
the Nanking incident. 10 Japanese participants chose the “Highly Uncomfortable” 
and 4 participants chose the “Uncomfortable” about the controversy of how many 
Chinese were killed by Japanese during the Nanking (Nanjing) incident. 6 people 
selected the “Neutral”, and only 1 person chose either the “Highly Comfortable” or 
“Comfortable” about this issue each. 1 person chose the “indifference,” and there 
were 2 participants to choose the “Unknown.” 
What China says about the visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese 
Prime Ministers and cabinet members. 5 Japanese chose the “Highly 
Uncomfortable” and 9 people chose the “Comfortable” about the issue of the 
visitation to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese Prime Ministers and cabinet members. 6 
people selected the “Neutral” and no one chose the “Indifference.” There were 3 
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people who selected “Comfortable,” and no one chose the “Highly Comfortable. One 
person chose “Unknown” about this issue.  
Description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese history textbooks. 
About this topic of the description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese history 
textbooks, 8 Japanese chose the “Highly Uncomfortable.” 7 people chose the “Rarely 
Comfortable (= Uncomfortable)” and 7 people chose the “Neutral” about this issue. 
No one chose the “Indifference,” and 2 people chose the “Unknown” about this issue. 
To analyze the participants’ individual nationalistic attribution, each 
participant received a score by the same calculation as the Chinese population 
received. 
Combination between individual nationalistic attribution and individuals’ 
attitudes (Section 3 &4) 
The two participants got the highest score of the individual nationalistic 
attribution (8) in the 25 participants (A and I). The lowest score of the individual 
nationalistic attribution was -2 in the 25 participants. (S) The mean of the score is 3.2. 
The participant A chose in the section4 “Other/Other option.” The person wrote, 
“Because they should share the natural resources.” A also replied that it is impossible 
to say which country governs the islands under the current situation, based on his/her 
knowledge. I’s answer of Section 4 is “Japan.” The participant I also replied that 
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Japan governs the islands under the current situation, based on his/her knowledge. 
The participant S’s answer of Section 4 is China. The S replied that Japan governs the 
islands under the current situation.  
The 18 participants (72%) got the score above 0 (Strong Individual 
Nationalistic Attribution). In the 18, 12 participants (67%) supported the Japan’s 
sovereignty over the islands. 2 participants (11%) thought that “No country should 
govern the islands.” The other 3 participants (17%) chose the “other/other option.” 
The two of them provided his/her opinion. The one stated that “Because they should 
share the natural resources.” The another stated that “both China and Japan should 
govern (the islands) together.”  
Only one (6%) Japanese participant showing the strong nationalistic attribution 
supports the Chinese sovereignty. The person provided the reasons why China should 
govern the islands and Japan should not govern the islands is that “Historically, China 
has governed the islands.” And, the reason why Japan should not govern the islands is 
because “Japan invaded China in the past.” However, the person did not have any 
ideas why China insists upon its sovereignty over the islands. 
The 7 participants (28%) got the score below or equal 0 (Weak Individual 
Nationalistic Attribution). In the 7 participants, 4 participants (57%) chose “No 
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country should govern the islands.” 2 participants (29%) supported the Japan’s 
sovereignty. Only one (14%) participant supported the China’s sovereignty, and no 
one chose “other/other options.” The 2 participants supporting the Japan’s sovereignty 
provided the reason. Two participants chose that the reason why Japan should govern 
the islands is that international law supports Japanese sovereignty. And, one of them 
chose that China should not govern the islands because Chinese statements are 
unreasonable. Another one chose, “Historically, Japan has governed the islands” and 
“the islands were stolen by China. 2 of the 4 participants having the attitude that no 
country should govern the islands provided the reasons. One participant wrote, “I 
believe no country should govern the islands. I think it is the fairest option for 
everyone that both countries can use the islands without issues. The other stated, “The 
option leads to be equal.”  
Analysis 
A majority of the participants having the strong individual nationalistic 
attribution support the Japanese sovereignty (67%). Only 11 % of the participants 
having strong individual nationalistic support the Chinese sovereignty. This result 
supports the hypothesis. Moreover, a majority of the people having the weak 
individual nationalistic attribution chose the attitude toward the dispute of the islands 
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other than supporting the Japanese sovereignty (71%). However, 29 % of the 
participants showing the weak individual nationalistic attribution supported the 
Japanese sovereignty. I will review other factors which might control the results 
which do not support the hypothesis. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
 
Validity of the Hypothesis. 
Both of the Chinese and Japanese population showed that the majority of the 
participants having the strong individual nationalistic attribution support their nation’s 
sovereignty. (Chinese: 72% and Japanese: 67%) For the Chinese participants, only 
20 % of the strong individual nationalistic attribution supported the Japanese 
sovereignty. For the Japanese participants, only 6% of the strong individual 
nationalistic participants supported the Chinese sovereignty.  
Moreover, both of the Chinese and Japanese population showed that a 
majority of the participants having the weak individual nationalistic attribution chose 
the attitude toward the dispute of the islands other than supporting their nation’s 
sovereignty. (Chinese: 86% and Japanese: 71%) For the Chinese participants, only 
14 % of the participants showing the weak individual nationalistic attribution support 
the Chinese sovereignty. For the Japanese population, 29 % of the participants 
showing the weak individual nationalistic attribution supported the Japanese 
sovereignty.  
Overall, the results of the survey support the main hypothesis that the 
62 
participants showing the strong individual nationalistic attribution are likely to 
support their national country’s sovereignty and oppose to the other country’s 
sovereignty. The result of the study suggests that the individual nationalistic 
attribution (i.e., social identity or national identity) among Chinese and Japanese 
contributes the islands dispute, which is also called “the epicenter (Lederach, 2015)” 
of the dispute. It should be addressed to transform the dispute.   
The other hypothesis that Chinese population would have stronger individual 
nationalistic attribution than Japanese one seems to be wrong. If comparing between 
Chinese and Japanese population having a strong individual nationalistic attribution, 
the result does not show any differences. (Both Chinese and Japanese: 72%) 
Moreover, the mean of the score of the individual nationalistic attribution shows that 
the Japanese population is slightly higher than the Chinese one. (The mean of the 
score of the individual nationalistic attribution, Chinese: 3.0, Japanese: 3.2) This 
result indicates that the national identity of the Japanese population is as strong as or 
stronger than the Chinese one. The Japanese national identity in terms of the islands 
dispute is formed by responding the criticism from China. Since China has started 
actively insisting its sovereignty from 2008, to reply the movement, Japanese 
individual nationalistic attribution would have been getting strong.     
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Before discussing potential methods of addressing the individual nationalistic 
attribution, I would like to highlight the participants who did not support the 
hypothesis.  
The four Chinese participants showed the strong individual nationalistic 
attribution but supported the Japanese sovereignty (O, P, T, and W). Participant P 
chose “unknown” for the two questions for measuring the individual nationalistic 
attribution in Section 3. The four questions which I prepared might not be appropriate 
to measure the P’s nationalistic attribution. Moreover, although P indicated that he or 
she is from 24 to 26 years old, P wrote that he/she lived in China for 29 years. Since 
the data is inconsistent, the P’s date’s credibility is questionable.  
Participant T chose three neutral for the four questions in Section 3. Thus, 
although T is categorized as a strong individual nationalist by the calculation, T might 
not have that strong nationalistic attribution. Therefore, it is still consistent with the 
hypothesis that T supports the Japanese sovereignty. Moreover, it would be arguable 
that the participant W is considered as Chinese because W has never lived in China 
and wrote his/her hometown as Florida in the U.S. I used the W’s result because W 
was identified as Chinese in the first question. However, the W’s identification might 
be different from who I targeted in this survey.  
Participant O’s connection to China is questionable to be considered as 
64 
Chinese because although O wrote a Chinese city as O’s hometown, O only lived in 
China for five years. It can be considered that O’s national identity is a different type 
from other candidates who lived more than half of their life in China. 
One Japanese participant showed the strong individual nationalistic 
attribution but supported the Chinese sovereignty (Q). The reason for the 
inconsistency would be also because Q is knowledgeable of the islands dispute. Q 
holds the doctoral degree in Asian studies. Q also holds the bachelor degree in 
Chinese. Thus, even though Q has the strong nationalistic attribution, Q might have a 
different reason why Q supports the China’s sovereignty, for instance, Q learned the 
strong evidence to support the China’s sovereignty in Q’s studies. 
The two Japanese participant showed the weak individual nationalistic 
attribution but supported the Japanese sovereignty (B and R). Both of the participants 
chose the neutral or indifference more than two for the answers for the section 3. Thus, 
it might be difficult to measure their nationalistic attribution by the four prepared 
questions. For instance, since participant B chose the neutral for all of the four 
questions, B might not be a weak individual nationalist so as R choosing the neutral 
for the three questions.  
Discussion 
 There are some shortcomings of this survey. First, it would be arguable 
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whether or not the four incidents, i.e., the Japan’s WWII invasion, the controversy of 
the Nanking incident, the visitation to the Yasukuni shrine by the Japanese prime 
ministers and cabinet members, and the controversy of the descriptions of the islands 
dispute in Japanese textbooks, can appropriately measure the individual nationalistic 
attribution for both of Chinese and Japanese participants. It would be a crucial to 
conduct further research about consists of Chinese and Japanese national identity in 
terms of the islands dispute. Then, the survey questions will be able to measure the 
individual nationalistic attribution more accurately. Second, the equation of 
calculating the individual nationalistic attribution needs to be reformed. I failed to 
define the “indifference” in the questionnaire. I also excluded “unknown” from the 
calculation, but the “unknown” might represent the weak nationalistic attribution. The 
method of scoring the individual nationalistic attribution needs to be improved.  
Third, I distributed the survey for the students at University of Oregon. Thus, 
they have already spent some amount of time in the U.S. This study abroad 
experience might affect their attitude toward the islands dispute and the China-Japan 
relationship. Moreover, some participants through the Amazonturk might not be 
qualified for this survey. Although some of them identified themselves Chinese or 
Japanese, they indicated that their nationalities are neither Chinese nor Japanese or 
they do not have any living experiences in the country. It has to be re-considered that 
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how people’s nationality in terms of the national identity should be determined. One 
might be able to argue that we should respect people’s subjective identification. Even 
though objectively, some of them should not be decided only by their governmental 
nationality and their living experiences in the country. In some cases, we should 
respect their subjective identification, too. However, in that case, their nationalistic 
attribution might be different from people whose subjective identification is the same 
as objective identification (such as I have a Japanese nationality and identify myself 
as Japanese.) 
 The survey also failed to ask the participants’ feelings when they answered 
the survey. Their feelings at that time might affect their answers of the survey. Overall, 
to obtain the more accurate data, individual interviews might have been conducted.   
 However, at least, this study shows that the individual nationalistic 
attribution based on the WWII history between China and Japan has some relationship 
to the individual attitudes toward the dispute of the islands. The participants who feel 
some degree of the uncomfortableness about the Japan’s invasion of China before and 
during the WWII, the Nanking incident, and the visitation to the Yasukuni shrine by 
the Japanese Prime Ministers and cabinet members tend to support their nation’s 
sovereignty.  
Moreover, the fourth question of Section 3 shows an interesting result. Only 
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38% of the Chinese population showed “Highly uncomfortable” or “Uncomfortable” 
for the factor, which is the description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese 
history textbooks, whereas, 63% of the Japanese population showed “Highly 
uncomfortable” or “Uncomfortable.” For the Japanese participants, the feeling about 
the description of the textbooks about the islands dispute showed the highest 
percentage of the uncomfortableness, but for the Chinese population, the feeling about 
the Nanking incident showed the highest percentage of the uncomfortableness. 
(Chinese: 76% chose “Highly uncomfortable” or “Uncomfortable”, Japanese: 56 % 
chose “Highly uncomfortable” or “Uncomfortable.”) This result indicates that the 
factors of the nationalistic attribution would be different between Chinese and 
Japanese population. For Chinese, the Nanking incident would be one of the strongest 
national memory to consist of their national identity in terms of the islands dispute. 
For Japanese, the islands dispute itself would strongly contribute establishing their 
national identity. The older historical incident influences on forming the Chinese 
national identity whereas the latest islands dispute effects on the Japanese national 
identity.  
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
68 
CONCLUSION 
 
 There exist some international procedures to resolve a territorial dispute 
between nations. The three possible methods - International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), and conciliation - may bring the end of the 
islands dispute between China and Japan. However, all of these methods have 
disadvantages when applied to the dispute. 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
The United Nations (U.N.) Charter envisions that disputes of a legal nature 
involving states would normally be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
The ICJ has heard many cases regarding the extent of maritime jurisdiction, but it has 
made a decision only for 14 cases (Center, 2010). Although the ICJ can hear a case of 
the islands dispute between China and Japan, there are several difficulties to use the 
ICJ for the dispute. 
Frist, Japan insists that “there exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be 
resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016).” 
In general, at least a filing party recognizes that there is a case with other parties, so 
the party files a lawsuit in a court. Initiating the ICJ procedure by Japan might 
conflicts with the current Japan’s position because if Japan files a lawsuit to the ICJ, 
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the world would recognize that Japan considers that there is a territorial issue between 
China and Japan. China also does not seem to be motivated to file this case to the ICJ. 
China clearly denied participating to the similar territorial dispute case filed by the 
Philippines to the PCA. We can assume that China is not willing to use the current 
international court procedures to resolve territorial disputes in the East and South 
China seas. 
Secondly, although ICJ decisions have the force of law, they are not always fully 
respected by parties. There is no enforcement mechanism (Center, 2010). Although 
the U.N. Security Council can discuss its non-compliance, China is a permanent 
member of the U.N. Security Council. Thus, if the ICJ’s decision about the islands 
dispute does not favor China, it would be hard to force China to comply with the ICJ 
decision. If no enforcement is available, the dispute will not be resolved in the real 
world. 
Thirdly, the ICJ reviews nine types of factors regarding adjudicating territorial 
claims: treaty law, geography, economy, culture effective control, history, uti 
possidetis juris, elitism, and ideology. In these nine factors, only the three of them: 
treaties, recognized historical boundaries (uti possidetis juris), and evidence of 
effective control have consistently been considered as a basis for decisions by the ICJ 
(Center, 2010). About the islands dispute between China and Japan, the ICJ would 
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review San Francisco Peace Treaty, China’s historical records, Japan’s claim of terra 
nullius, and recent maritime activities by Chinese vessels. Although China would 
bring Shimonoseki treaty and other legal documents at the end of WWII as evidence, 
Japan would oppose the evidence as irrelevant. The ICJ will make a decision based on 
these arguments, but the ICJ cannot address the issue of nationalistic attribution. Thus, 
since the ICJ only can decide which country has a legally recognized claim based on 
the treaty, historical boundaries, and evidence of effective control, the ICJ cannot 
reconcile the psychological issue of the nationalistic attribution between Chinese and 
Japanese. If the ICJ makes a decision, either Chinese or Japanese would experience a 
feeling of losing. This feeling would strengthen their members’ nationalistic 
attribution. As a consequence, although the ICJ decided which country governs the 
islands, it would enhance a status competition between China and Japan. Although the 
ICJ may be able to provide a resolution in front of the court, it would be hard to assist 
the two nations to transform to the peaceful and corporative future. 
Moreover, according to the statute of the ICJ (International Court of Justice, 2017), 
only states may be parties in cases before the Court (Chapter II, Article 34-1). Taiwan 
is not a U.N. member state (United Nations, 2017). Therefore, although Taiwan is 
claiming its sovereignty over the islands, the ICJ cannot resolve the dispute with all 
stakeholders and hear Taiwan’s claim as a party. 
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Due to the complexity of the islands dispute, the ICJ would be unlikely to bring a 
peaceful outcome about this issue.   
Arbitration 
The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) is an intergovernmental body with a 
membership of over 100 states in The Hague, the Netherlands. It was founded by 
treaties in 1899 and 1907. The PCA offers arbitrations including territorial cases 
between states and between states and nonstate actors (Center, 2010). Although 
Taiwan is not a state of the PCA, the PCA can hear the Taiwan’s argument as a party 
to the arbitration (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2017). 
It would be useful to compare a case between the Philippines and China from 
2013 to 2019 to think about the possibility of using the PCA for the islands dispute in 
the East China Sea. In 2013, the Philippines brought its claim of the sovereignty over 
islands of the South China Sea against China to the PCA (Hunt, 2016). China has 
refused to participate in the case, but under Annex VII to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (Convention), the PCA judged that it had a 
jurisdiction over the dispute. The Convention states, “An arbitral tribunal must satisfy 
itself that it has jurisdiction to decide a matter presented to it, even if a party chooses 
not to participate in the proceedings or to make a formal objection (Permanent Court 
of Arbitration, 2015).” 
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 Although China has repeatedly stated that “it will neither accept nor participate 
in the arbitration unilaterally initiated by the Philippines (Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, 2016),” China published its position paper on the South China Sea 
arbitration in 2014. The PCA treated the position paper as effectively constituting a 
plea concerning the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in 2015. On July 12, 2016, the PCA 
concluded that “to the extent, China has historic rights to resources in the waters of 
the South China Sea, such rights were extinguished in the Convention (Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, 2016).” “There was no evidence that China had historically 
exercised exclusive control over the waters or their resources (Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, 2016).” The PCA concluded that the Chinese argument has no legal basis 
to claim historical rights to resources within the sea (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 
2016). 
However, China refused to accept the ruling. On the contrary, China installed 
significant weapons systems on the artificial islands in the South China Sea (Phillips, 
2016). This Chinese action was reported by a U.S. think tank on November 23, 2016, 
after the announcement by the PCA. The Philippines’ current president, Rodrigo 
Duterte, commented on this report that “I will demand that they go out of my country 
(Philippines to ‘set aside’ South China Sea tribunal ruling to avoid imposing on 
Beijing, 2016).” However, he also told reporters, “There is nothing that we can do 
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about that now, whether or not it is being done for purposes of further militarizing 
these facilities that they have put up (Philippines to ‘set aside’ South China Sea 
tribunal ruling to avoid imposing on Beijing, 2016).” He further commented that he 
would continue to pursue peaceful means. Thus, although the PCA decided that China 
does not have any rights over the claimed lands and area in the South China Sea, there 
is no effective enforcement in China. The PCA could not fully resolve the dispute 
between Philippines and China even though the former spent about 6 years to obtain 
the ruling in its favor. We can easily assume that the similar situation would take place 
if Japan takes the islands dispute in the East China Sea to the PCA. Therefore, the 
PCA is unlikely to resolve the dispute like the ICJ. 
Other dispute resolution methods such as conciliation 
As other dispute resolution methods, we can consider the possibility of 
conciliation between China, Taiwan, and Japan. The conciliation can be happened by 
various ways such as having a non-stake third party to facilitate a dialogue between 
the three nations. However, it would be hard to find a completely impartial third party 
having an enough authority to convince China, Taiwan, and Japan to reach a peaceful 
agreement. Moreover, it is unlikely to desire the conciliation solely by the three 
nations.  
These international methods are too early to be applied the islands dispute because 
74 
China and Japan do not have the intention to resolve the dispute cooperatively. The 
transformation has to be occurred between China and Japan before using the ICJ, the 
PCA, or conciliation. All the methods require a cooperative attitude toward resolving 
disputes. The nationalistic attribution interrupts to lead China and Japan to have the 
corporative attitude. To effectively use these methods in the future, as the survey 
suggested, we need to find a way to release Chinese and Japanese from their 
nationalistic attribution. This releasing process can transform the islands dispute 
between China and Japan. 
How can we make Chinese and Japanese individual’s nationalistic attribution less 
influential on choosing an attitude toward the islands dispute? Hogg (2006) suggests 
that if its members of a group are aware that they are playing on the same team with 
the outgroup, the transformation may occur (Hogg, 2006). In the relationship between 
China and Japan, there would be no large power difference. It is true that China would 
be economically much stronger than Japan if simply comparing GDP10 (The World 
Bank, 2015), but both are among the largest economic powers in the world. In 
addition, China and Japan do not compete against each other economically, but they 
are dependent each other. So, it would not be crucial to define which country is more 
and less powerful in the relationship. Rather, the much more significant point is that 
                                                   
10 China’s GDP is $11,064,665 and . Japan’s  is $4,383,076. 
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both of China and Japan have to recognize that they are playing for the same team and 
are parts of themselves. More concretely, to overcome the in-group favoritism, it is 
crucial to emphasize that China and Japan are playing for Asia as the same group and 
are parts of Asia. 
 However, this idea might suggest a different direction from that which both 
Chinese and Japanese governments want to move toward. It is obvious that the 
Japanese government under the current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe maintains a policy 
of focusing on keeping or improving a relationship with the U.S. rather than China. 
After announcing the result of the U.S. presidential election, the Japanese Prime 
Minister flew to New York to schedule a meeting with U.S. president elected Donald 
Trump, immediately (Miller, 2017). The Prime Minister must have thought that it was 
his government’s first priority to establish a personal relationship with the new U.S. 
president to reaffirm that the U.S. would join Japan to defend the Senkaku Islands 
(Miller, 2017). Thus, it is clear that as a strong ally of the U.S., the Japanese 
government is going to oppose to China’s claim regarding the islands dispute. 
Addressing the collective memory of WWII might be the second option to 
release Chinese and Japanese from the nationalistic attribution. The theory of 
collective memory suggests that providing counter memory can help to challenge or 
oppose to the process of creating the collective memory (Tint, 2010). It would be 
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painful for both Chinese and Japanese, but we have to learn each other’s narrative of 
the WWII’s history and create a new story of WWII together to unlock ourselves from 
the past to the present and future. This co-learning can be implemented from the 
academic level, such as an international conference and co-research project with 
Chinese, Taiwanese, and Japanese researchers. 
 As a conclusion, I would like to add the China-Japan islands dispute as one 
of the topics for the field of the conflict and dispute resolution. I hope this paper will 
open a peaceful discussion about the topic to lead a bright future for new generations. 
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APPENDIX B 
SURVEY DISTRIBUTION 
 
 Chinese Japanese 
Total 62 36 
Group 1 (University of 
Oregon) 
22 (Answer 22) 21 (Answer 21) 
Group 2 
(Amazonmechanical turk) 
40 (Answer 14) 15 (Answer 12) 
Qualified 28 25 
Excluded 6 (Taiwanese 1) 8 
Agreed 
Disagreed 
27 
1 
0 
0 
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APPENDIX C 
SURVEY FOR CHINESE PARTICIPANTS 
 
Section 3 Please choose your attitude about the following incidents. (①～④) 
① Japan invading China before and during the World War II 
○High comfortable 
○Comfortable 
○Neutral 
○Uncomfortable 
○Highly uncomfortable 
○Indifference 
○Unknown about the incident 
 
② The controversy of how many Chinese were killed by Japanese during the 
Nanking (Nanjing) incident* 
 
*Nanking inciden in 1937, the Japanese army force murdered peopke including 
soldiers and civilians in the Chinese city of nanking (or Nanjing). 
○High comfortable 
○Comfortable 
○Neutral 
○Uncomfortable 
○Highly uncomfortable 
○Indifference 
○Unknown about the incident 
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③the visits to the Yasukuni shrine* by Japanese Prime Ministers and cabit members 
*Yasukuni Shrine: The shrine is located in Tokyo, Japan. The shrine is dedicated to  
Japanese solders and servicement who died fighting on behalf of the Emperor of  
Japan in the last 150 years. The shrine is at the center of an international  
controverrsy by honoring war criminals convicted by a post World War II court  
includign 14 Class A war criminals. 
 
○High comfortable 
○Comfortable 
○Neutral 
○Uncomfortable 
○Highly uncomfortable 
○Indifference 
○Unknown about the incident 
 
④Description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese history textbooks 
○High comfortable 
○Comfortable 
○Neutral 
○Rarely comfortable 
○Highly uncomfortable 
○Indifference 
○Unknown about the incident 
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APPENDIX D 
SURVEY FOR JAPANESE PARTICIPANTS 
 
Section 3  Please choose your attirude about the following incidents. (①～④) 
① What China says about the Japanese invasion before and during the World War II 
○High comfortable 
○Comfortable 
○Neutral 
○Uncomfortable 
○Highly uncomfortable 
○Indifference 
○Unknown about the incident 
 
②  the controversy of how many Chinese were killed by Japanese durign the 
Nanking incident* 
 
*Nanking inciden in 1937, the Japanese army force murdered peopke including 
soldiers and civilians in the Chinese city of nanking (or Nanjing). 
 
○High comfortable 
○Comfortable 
○Neutral 
○Uncomfortable 
○Highly uncomfortable 
○Indifference 
○Unknown about the incident 
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③ What China says about the visits to the Yasukuni shrine* by Japanese Prime 
Ministers and cabinet member 
 
*Yasukuni Shrine: The shrine is located in Tokyo, Japan. The shrine is dedicated 
to Japanese solders and servicement who died fighting on behalf of the Emperor 
of Japan in the last 150 years. The shrine is at the center of an international 
controverrsy by honoring war criminals convicted by a post World War II court 
includign 14 Class A war criminals. 
 
○High comfortable 
○Comfortable 
○Neutral 
○Uncomfortable 
○Highly uncomfortable 
○Indifference 
○Unknown about the incident 
 
④ What China says about description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese 
history textbooks 
○High comfortable 
○Comfortable 
○Neutral 
○Rarely comfortable 
○Highly uncomfortable 
○Indifference 
○Unknown about the incident 
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APPENDIX E 
SURVEY FOR SECTION 4 
Section 4 
Thank you for doing the survey. You are almost done! 
Based on your knowledge, which country governs the islands? 
Select one answer. 
○China 
○Japan 
○It is difficult to say which country governs the islands under the current situation. 
○Other 
 
Which country should govern the islands? 
○China 
○Japan 
○Other/Other option 
○No country should govern the islands. 
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APPENDIX F 
RESULTS OF INDIVIDUAL NATIONALISTIC ATTRIBUTION 
(1) Japan invading China before and during the WWII 
 
(2) The controversy of how many Chinese were killed by Japanese during the 
Nanking (Nanjing) incident 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Uncomfortable
Highly uncomfortable
Neutral
Comfortable
Indiffrence
Unknown
Japanese Chinese
%
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Highly uncomfortable
Uncomfortable
Neutral
Indifferent
Comfortable
Highly comfotable
Unknown
Japan China
%
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(3) The visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese Prime Ministers and cabinet 
members 
 
 
 
(4) The description of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in Japanese history textbooks 
 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Highly Uncomfortable
Uncomfortable
Neutral
Unknown
Comfortable
Indifference
Japan China
%
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Highly Uncomfortable
Uncomfortable
Neutral
Unknown
Comfortable
Indifference
Japan China
%
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